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2we will show that is is possible to extend the PNS at-
tack such that the photon number statistics, as seen by
Bob, is indistinguishable from that resulting from weak
laser pulses and a lossy channel. This result holds in the
relevant paramter regime of mean photon number  of
the Poissonian photon number distribution of the weak
laser pulse and of the transmission factor  of the quan-
tum channel. The extension of the PNS attack allows the
eavesdropper to remain undetected even if Alice and Bob
measure the photon number distribution via coincidence
rates in Bob's photodetectors.
II. EXTENDED PNS ATTACK
We consider a photon source emitting signals with a
Poissonian photon number distribution with mean value
. Weak laser pulses are well described by Fock states
with this photon number distribution, but our analysis
can be extended to other distributions. The quantum
channel is described by a single-photon transmission ef-
ciency . Then we nd at Bob's end of the quantum
channel again a Poissonian photon number distribution








On the other hand, the PNS attack described above will
give another photon number statistics. Let Eve perform
the photon number splitting attack in which she blocks
a fraction b of the single-photon signals. Then we nd a


















exp[ ] n > 1
(2)











(exp[(1  )]  1) : (3)
We nd b
match






ln[1+]. This last point corresponds precisely
to the situation where 1 P
loss
[0] = 1  (1+ ) exp[ ],
that is, the number of non-vacuum signals arriving at the
end of the lossy quantum channel is equal to the number
of multi-photon signals emanating from the source. For
values of  between these two extreme values, b takes on
values in the interval (0; 1), and this is the regime we are
dealing with.
With this choice the photon number distribution after







exp[ ] n = 0
(1 +  + 
2




exp[ ] n > 1 :
(4)
This photon number distribution is not Poissonian. The
question is whether Eve can make it Poissonian with-
out loosing any advantage of the PNS attack. It is easy
to come up with a possible solution: Eve can extract
not only one, but two or more photons from pulses de-
pending on the photon number in each pulse. With this
method it is possible to redistribute probabilities from
higher to lower photon numbers, but not the other way
round. Therefore the necessary and suÆcient condition













is satised for all n. This condition that the change of
probability from any high-photon number part to a low-
photon number part goes in the right direction.
In order to work as an eavesdropping attack, we need
to make sure that the number of non-vacuum signals re-
mains unchanged. Indeed, in our extended strategy we
will never take 'the last photon' out of a pulse, so the
number of non-vacuum signals does not change. This
guarantees that the information gain by Eve on the sig-
nals remains unchanged. The only change is that of the
photon number statistics of the signals arriving at Bob's
end of the quantum channel.
III. EVALUATION OF EXTENDED PNS
ATTACK
In this section we will show that the conditions (5) is
satised in a parameter regime that we will show in the
following section to be relevant to practical QKD. Thus
we show that Eve can mimic Poissonian photon number
distribution even while performing the PNS attack via
our extension.
We dene the d
n
as the dierence of the two probability










= 0 due to the matching via the blocking
parameter b. We will show that in a relevant paramter
regime we nd that d
n







+ 1;1]. This is suÆcient (though not necessary)
to fulll the conditions (5). With other words, with in-
creasing value of n, the dierence d
n
vanishes for n = 0,
then takes negative values until for n  n
l
+ 1 it turns
positive.
Let us rst show by induction that once the function
turned positive, it will not turn back negative for n  2
and the parameter regime   3=4. Assume that d
n
 0






















mean photon number m
FIG. 1: As a function of the mean photon number  and the
transmission eÆciency  we see the area (grey shade) where
the original PNS attack yields less single photon signals than
the corresponding lossy channel. In this region the extended
PNS attack is successful in that it mimics the lossy channel
not only in the fraction of non-vacuum signals but also in the
whole photon number statistics.








































 2. Instead, we will show that in a suitable
parameter regime d
1







= 0 and d
0
= 0 that there must
be some positive d
n
for n  2. With other words, for  <
3=4 we nd that d
1
 0 is a suÆcient condition to allow
a redistribution of the photon number distribution after
the PNS attack to make it Poissonain without changing
the ow of information between the parties.
The required condition d
1
 0 can be analyzed numer-
ically only. It is given after a regrouping as
(1 + + 
2
=2) exp[ ]  (1 + ) exp[ ]  0 : (9)
The rst term describes the fraction of signals containing
0 or 1 photons after the original PNS attack while the
second term describes the target value for this fraction.
Note that we xed the fraction of vacuum signals so that
this is, indeed, a statement about the fraction of single-
photon signals. The region where d
1
is negative is plotted
in gure 1.
The borderline shown in gure 1 can be evaluated more














mean photon number m
FIG. 2: We compare the approximation (dashed line) for









] = 0 (solid line).
d
1































As we see from Fig. 2, this is a good approximation for
low photon numbers. Note that the lowest order of the





antees that the extended PNS attack is always successful
as long as  and  are small. This is mirrored in the in-
nitely steep rise of the limiting line shown in gure 2.
IV. APPLICATION TO SECURITY PROOFS
AND DISCUSSION
From the security proofs [10, 11] we know the optimal
choice of the mean photon number  from the point of
view of Alice and Bob. This optimization can be under-
stood starting from the idea that Alice and Bob would
like to optimize the gain rate of the QKD process. This
gain rate G is bounded in a conservative scenario from










probability of the source and p
exp
as the fraction of non-
vacuum signals detected by Bob. The factor 1=2 comes
from a sifting state of the QKD protocol and is specic
for the BB84 protocol. For other polarization based pro-
tocols such as the six-state protocol [15] we nd other fac-
tors, however, the reasoning is independent of this factor.










(exp[ ]  (1 + ) exp[ ]) (12)
and this expression is optimized for small values of  by

opt
 . As it turns out, that value remains approxi-
mately optimal in a detailed analysis taking other error
4sources into account [10, 11]. In typical experiments we
nd that even higher photon numbers than the optimal
ones are used. That pushes the working point even fur-
ther away from the critical line in gure 1.
The statements above are made for a conservative sce-
nario where all loss and all errors are attributed to Eve.
It will be desirable to extend this analysis by making as-
sumptions stating that Eve cannot change the dark count
rate of Bob's detectors and cannot increase the detection
eÆciency. It turns out that this extension is not trivial
at all. The analysis in our paper, however, puts some
bounds on the results of such an analysis. Once Eve can
perform an extended PNS attack such that her action
mimics a lossy quantum channel both in the transmis-
sion eÆciency and the Poissonian photon number statis-
tics, and she can block all single-photon signals, then the
transmission cannot be secure.
At the heart of our paper is the statement that stochas-
tic processes such as loss in a quantum channel can be ex-
plained by a rather cunning strategy of a third party, for
example an eavesdropper. It means that the eavesdrop-
per can access some preferred signals while suppressing
others such that the resulting action is indistinguishable
even in principle from a normal lossy channel for given
input signals. It is unclear so far what input signals have
to be chosen to make such a situation impossible.
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